David Billings of Middletown is a retired U.S. senior foreign service officer and a member of the U.S. Global Leadership Coalition’s Delaware Advisory Committee.
For the millions of Venezuelans persecuted or driven out by the Venezuelan regime, a new day dawns. But will recent U.S. actions to apprehend Nicolas Maduro instill justice, strengthen U.S. interests and lead to a better future for the country? Or will they lead to further destabilization and blowback, as we have seen before after other major U.S. interventions in Latin America? The keys to a successful U.S. effort will be long-term commitments to reform the security apparatus, create a stable environment for international investment and incentivize the Venezuelan diaspora to return home. In the interim, and whether the Trump administration likes it or not, Venezuelans will expect the U.S. to provide for the country’s humanitarian and everyday needs. With the recent dismantling of U.S. agencies and defunding of organizations that did this work, the administration will face this endeavor without the necessary foreign aid infrastructure, expertise and capacity.
Reforming Venezuela’s security apparatus will not be easy, but it is a necessary step to ensure economic and political stability. The politicized Venezuelan military, police and intelligence services, augmented by Maduro’s “colectivos” (loyal gangs) — all supported by Cuba’s intelligence service — helped Maduro stay in power. Their tentacles run deep into the social, economic and political workings of the country. To untangle this complex structure, the U.S. will need to assist a legitimately elected Venezuelan government to undertake security sector reform. Based on hard lessons learned in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere, this reform must be Venezuelan-led, involve independent oversight and be linked to the reintroduction of good-governance principles, including the rule of law, transparency and respect for human rights. It will require funding, expertise and years of commitment.
Venezuela possesses the world’s largest proven oil reserves at more than 300 billion barrels, which is more than Saudi Arabia. However, since the 1990s, production of oil in Venezuela has plummeted, as a result of corruption, lack of investment in infrastructure and technology, and U.S. sanctions. The national oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela S.A., is racked with debt, due to corruption and mismanagement. International investors will need to commit billions to restructure and modernize PDVSA. This won’t be easy. Unlike Saudi oil, Venezuelan crude is expensive to extract and difficult to refine, making the massive investments needed less attractive to potential investors. To entice investors, a new Venezuelan government will need to establish a clear legal framework that protects international investors. The recent Delaware court’s decision approving the $5.9 billion sale of Citgo parent PDV Holding (the U.S.-based parent of Citgo) to Amber Energy takes on new light; if the sale proceeds, and PDVSA is restructured under a legitimately elected government, it could finally settle billions in debt and play a key financial role in rebuilding the country and securing a stable energy future for Venezuela and the U.S.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the “brain drain” of more than 8 million Venezuelans, including doctors, lawyers, engineers and other professionals, who fled the country over the past 10 years, leaves an enormous gap in the talent pool that will be required to rebuild. Venezuelans love their country, and some may return following the removal of Maduro. However, many of them have settled into new lives across the hemisphere and will need an incentive to return. A new, legitimately elected government will need to attract this expertise to rebuild public sector institutions and revitalize the economy. In the end, the best incentive will be a politically and economically stable and safe country.
Having worked on the Venezuela portfolio, and in a number of other countries in transition, I can tell you that the road ahead will be fraught with pitfalls. Among these are the lack of sustained political will at home and spoilers — both Venezuelan and foreign — who will try to derail U.S. efforts. To have any hope of success, the administration must rapidly rebuild its foreign aid infrastructure and re-recruit the necessary expertise. And it will require a commitment of long-term bilateral economic and security assistance. After more than 25 years of open-ended wars and trillions of dollars in U.S. taxpayers’ treasure spent, Americans are tired of open-ended entanglements abroad. However, “running” Venezuela by installing a friendly government without undertaking the hard reform that is required — and providing everyday needs to desperate Venezuelans in the meantime — will lead to certain failure.
Reader reactions, pro or con, are welcomed at civiltalk@iniusa.org.
